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AFTERWORD
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION RULES FOR THE
1990s
Joel Davidow*
It is both timely and appropriate that domestic and foreign law jour-
nals review the development of international competition rules for the
coming decade. There are several reasons for this: First, the world is
entering an era in which major power conflicts will be less dominated
by military threats and ideological differences and will center more on
economic competition.' Arguably, one can characterize even the "Crisis
in the Gulf" as an antitrust/merger control issue: Iraq, which previ-
ously controlled ten percent of the world's oil reserves staged a hostile
takeover of Kuwait, thereby doubling its control to approximately
twenty percent of the world's known oil reserves, 2 and consumer na-
tions sought and achieved prompt divestiture to prevent such market
power from being permanently acquired and abused. Iraq resorted
lastly to predatory conduct, destroying the Kuwaiti oil fields that it was
in imminent danger of losing. This extreme example highlights why
creation and harmonization of competition rules and principles is such
a pervasive issue.
Second, the transformation of eastern Europe and the deregulation/
privatization trends occurring in western Europe seem to indicate that
* Partner, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C. and Adjunct Professor,
Washington College of Law, The American University. Formerly Chief, Foreign Com-
merce Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice.
I. See Reasoner, The State of Antitrust, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 63, 65 (1990) (assert-
ing that United States antitrust policy will become increasingly important as world
economic competition increases).
2. Persian Gulf Crisis: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1990) (Statement of Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of
Defense).
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the majority of future world trade and competition will be among coun-
tries with capitalistic systems. These systems will likely feature free
competition among investor-owned enterprises internally, and operate
under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 3
(GATT) externally. Poland, for example, adopted an antitrust law and
created an enforcement agency that is busily engaged in privatization.
Likewise, Hungary enacted a series of competition laws addressing
both internal and external economic activity in November 1990. Even
the Soviet Union is considering enactment of competition laws.'
Third, some advanced market economy countries are in the process
of strengthening and harmonizing the finer points of their antitrust and
international trade laws.7 Italy passed its first antitrust law in February
1991. Canada and the European Community (EC) adopted merger no-
tification and control systems in the late 1980s.' Free market countries
have been developing common standards through antitrust legislation
and international trade legislation since the middle 1970s.9 The Organ-
ization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted
guidelines for transnational corporations in 1976 that included competi-
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5 A3(6)1365,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, T.I.A.S. 1700 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT was created in 1948
to serve as the vehicle for the reduction of tariffs between nations; K. DAM, THE
GATT: LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 11 (1970).
4. See Poland, Law of 24 February 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices,
reprinted in U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF. 3/5, at 47 (1990) (establishing the laws
designed to govern monopolistic practices by individuals or associations in the Republic
of Poland).
5. See Review of the Work of the Second Five Year Review Conference on Control
of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.3/L.I/Add. at 3, 9
(1990) (summarizing the Hungarian representative's statement at an UNCTAD meet-
ing). The representative explained that the Hungarian Act of 1988 on Economic As-
sociations established that the Hungarian government ended the State monopoly on
foreign trade. Id. The representative also explained that Hungary passed the Act on
Unfair Economic Activity which encouraged free competition, lifted abuse of dominant
economic position, and established harsher sanctions and fines. Id.
6. Annual Report on Restrictive Business Practice Developments, U.N. Doc. TD/
B/1261/, TD/B/RBP/76 1 6-66 at 15 (1990).
7. See I ANTITRUST AND RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES vii (J. Marke & N.
Samie eds. 1982) (providing primary source materials necessary for an understanding
of international antitrust issues).
8. See id. (listing a number of bilateral treaties, proposals, and agreements relating
to international antitrust or restrictive practices).
9. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1975); Codified Text of the Andean
Foreign Investment Code, Decision No. 24, adopted Dec. 31, 1970 by the Commission
of the Cartagena Agreement, as amended by Decision No. 37 dated June 24, 1971,
Decision No. 37-A dated July 17, 1971, Decision No. 70 dated Feb. 13, 1973, Decision
No. 103 dated Oct. 30, 1976, and Decision No. 109 dated Nov. 30, 1976, reprinted in
BARTON & FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT: SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
88, 388 (1986) (reprinting regulatory and legislative agreements on trade and antitrust
issues).
[VOL. 6:465
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION RULES
tion principles.10 In 1980, the United Nations General Assembly unani-
mously endorsed the Set of Principles and Rules for the Control of Re-
strictive Business Practices." This code urged nations to adopt a
domestic law, endorsed the principle of national treatment for foreign
enterprises, expounded a list of cartel or dominant firm practices that
should be curtailed by governments and avoided by enterprises, and set
a timetable for further work and study to harmonize national ap-
proaches to this issue. 2 Finally, a ten year review conference was held
in Geneva in November and December 1990, and ended with further
exhortations that nations should adopt and strengthen laws for the con-
trol of restrictive business practices.1 3
In addition to national changes in competition policy, there have
been several modifications in international trade rules. For example,
GATT members agreed in 1979 on a code of conduct that further har-
monized rules for the control of international dumping.1 ' Furthermore,
members agreed to additions to the code of conduct prohibiting export
subsidies and some domestic subsidies, and standardizing national ap-
proaches to the imposition of countervailing duties."0 A round of GATT
negotiations has been ongoing since 1986 in Uruguay."6 Negotiations
broke down in December 1990 because of disagreement over the extent
to which agricultural subsidies should be reduced and trade liberalized
10. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SeC-
RETARY-GENERAL'S 1976 REPORT, ANNEX TO THE DECLARATION OF 21sT JUNE, 1976
BY GOVERNMENTS OF OECD-MEIBER COUNTRIES ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMIENT
AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES,
Annex 4 (rev. ed. 1979) (providing an overview of the policies underlying the guide-
lines and emphasizing the potential harm multinational enterprises may cause because
of their economic power).
I1. U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF./I0 at I (1990).
12. Id.
13. U.N. Conference Urges States to Improve Control of Restrictive Business
Practices: Adopts Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation, U.N. Doc.
TAC/1609 (1990).
14. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. 171 (1980).
15. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI. XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1979, GATT, BISD, 26th Supp. 56
(1980).
16. The "Uruguay Round" of talks began in September 1986 in Punta del Este,
Uruguay. Bradley, Intellectual Property Rights. Investment and Trade in Services in
the Uruguay Round: Laying the Foundations, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1987).
Representatives for 24 nations met to consider a new set of trade regulations. Id. at 59.
Among the most ambitious programs on the agenda were areas not previously ad-
dressed in prior trade rounds, such as investment, intellectual property rights, and trade
in services. Id.
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in regard to agricultural products, but resumed in February 1991.1 7 If
the Uruguay Round succeeds, the result will likely be more liberal
rules regarding trade, services, and treatment of foreign investments, as
well as greater protection against unfair competition by world traders
who pirate intellectual property. Even if the negotiation fails, progress
toward harmonization of competition and trade rules will undoubtedly
continue within the context of regional agreements such as the ex-
panding EC 1992 program 18 and the proposed United States-Mexico
(and perhaps Canada) free trade agreement.'"
Returning to the subject of national antitrust policies, between 1945
and 1965, a consensus developed that modern market economy coun-
tries needed laws that, at a minimum, prohibit private cartel arrange-
ments and exclusionary conduct by market-dominating firms.20 In the
late 1950s, only eight of the twenty-four OECD member states had a
sufficiently developed interest in antitrust to participate in the OECD
Committee on Control of Restrictive Business Practices;21 by 1975,
twenty-two of the twenty-four member states participated. 22 While
17. The Round was scheduled to end in December 1990 but to date has not been
completed. See Uruguay Round to be Extended Due to Deadlock in Agricultural
Talks, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 10, 1990, at S-I (announcing a deadlock in the talks
due to the lack of progress in agreeing to farm reforms). The EC is generally viewed as
the reason for the suspension of talks, as it refuses to offer reductions in export subsi-
dies and border protection. Id. See generally International Consumer Groups Stress
Need for Strong Agreement to End Uruguay Round, [July-Dec.] Int'l Trade Rep.(BNA) No. 7, at 1806-07 (Nov. 28, 1990) (noting consumer groups' interest in the
outcome of the Uruguay Round).
18. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
12-29, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; see Davidow, Competition Policy, Merger Control and the
European Community's 1992 Program, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. - (1991)
(providing an in-depth discussion of recent developments in European Economic Com-
munity competition policy).
19. See Bush Meets with President Salinas in Mexico, Talks Include FTA Propo-
sal, [July-Dec.] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 1793 (Nov. 28, 1990) (discussing
the meeting between United States President Bush and Mexican President Carlos Sali-
nas de Gortan). The Presidents expressed hope that they could begin negotiations on
the establishment of a United States-Mexico free trade zone as soon as spring, 1991.
Id. The Bush Administration favors including Canada in the United States-Mexico
agreement and creating a North American free trade area. Id.
20. See Hawk, The International Application of the Sherman Act in Its Second
Century, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 161, 164-65, (1990) (discussing international antitrust
policy in general and exploring the role that United States antitrust law will play in its
further development). The author states that more foreign governments are moving
toward noninterventionist, market-oriented economies and that there is growing world-
wide consensus that cartels must be limited. Id. at 165.
21. See Zisler, Work of the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 289, 291 (1974) (reviewing the consultation and con-
ciliation recommendations adopted by the OECD council).
22. See generally 4 OECD GUIDE TO LEGISLATION ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES (Supp. 1978) (listing antitrust legislation adopted by OECD member
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there is international movement toward antitrust regulation, there have
been stragglers in this process. Italy, for example, only passed its first,
basic antitrust law in 1990.23
When drafting antitrust legislation, nations must make difficult and
important policy decisions. One of the most basic policy questions fac-
ing major foreign market economy countries is the extent to which they
should emulate the more stringent antitrust laws and enforcement
measures developed in such nations as the United States. These meas-
ures include stiff penalties, private damage enforcement, and merger
control. The EC adopted a "ten percent of turnover rule" 2' and re-
cently used it to impose more than $40 million in fines on British and
Belgian companies for a cartel agreement. 2' European nations, how-
ever, generally have shied away from expressly authorizing private an-
titrust damage actions. 26 Japan, on the other hand, pursuant to the
1990 Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) talks with the United
States, agreed to alter previous policies and make private actions easier
to bring and win.27 The Japanese will now allow rulings of the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission to be used as prima facie evidence of guilt in
states); see also Zisler, supra note 21, at 291 (discussing the OECD's
recommendations).
23. See Italy Enacts First Statute to Establish Antitrust Regime. [July-Dec.] An-
titrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1485, at 518 (Oct. 4, 1990) (noting that Italy
passed antitrust legislation on Sept. 27, 1990).
24. See EC Commission Rejects Latest Bid by IBM to Settle Four-Year-Old Anti-
trust Case, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) No. 31. at 939 (May 8.
1984) (discussing the EC's consideration of the application of 10 percent of IBM's
worldwide sales as a fine against the company).
25. See EC Commission Imposes Largest Fines for Cartel Arrangement in Soda
Ash Sector, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1497. at 14 (Jan. 3.
1991) (quoting the European Commission's Directorate General IV who called the
breach "serious" and fined Solvay ECU S30 million and ICI ECU S17 million).
26. See Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law, 82 Mlict. L. REv. 1364.
1366 (1984) (discussing EC civil, rather than criminal, antitrust enforcement meth-
ods); see also Davidow, The Worldwide Influence of U.S. Antitrust, 35 ATITRFLST
BULL. 603, 620 n.96 (1990) (explaining that there has been very little private antitrust
litigation outside of the United States). European nations have litigated fewer than 12
antitrust cases in their histories. Id. at 620.
27. See Key Elements of U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative Report Re-
leased by the Office of the USTR on June 28. 1990 , reprinted in [July-Dec.) Antitrust
& Trust Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1443, at 28. 29 (July 5. 1990) [hereinafter Key Ele-
ments] (explaining Japan's agreement to enforce the Antimonopoly Act (AMA) by
making private remedies for AMA violations effective).
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private damage actions.28 Japan also agreed to raise its monetary pen-
alties for violations of its Antimonoply Act significantly.2"
Several countries have adopted merger control rules patterned after
United States antitrust laws. Canada adopted a premerger notification,
automatic injunction system similar to that of the United States.30 The
EC adopted its first premerger notification, automatic injunction sys-
tem at the end of 1989.-" Due to political constraints, however, the EC
Commission has been granted authority only over transactions by giant
companies (more than $5 billion in assets) and may halt only those
transactions involving creation or aggrevation of market dominating po-
sitions.32 The United States, Germany, and Canada can prevent merg-
ers that reduce the number of significant competitors to four or less (an
oligopoly).33 Therefore, the EC merger control system will have little
practical significance unless it is strengthened by easing these require-
ments to allow it greater ability to prevent more average-sized mergers
and ones not involving the threat of monopoly.
Another crucial obstacle countries face when formulating competi-
tion rules is that of assessing their potential impact on national eco-
nomic interests. In 1970, Lester Thurow argued persuasively that suing
28. See JFTC is Urged to Offer Help in Suing Antitrust Violators, [Jan.-June]
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1472, at 1026 (June 28, 1990) (discussing a
recommendation made by a Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) study group to
release information about an investigation by the JFTC to assist in bringing a court
case).
29. See Key Elements, supra note 27, at 29 (explaining that Japan agreed to intro-
duce legislation to increase AMA penalties to a level sufficient to deter violations),
Joint Report of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive IV-3 (June 28, 1990) (United States Trade Representative) (discussing the joint
report prepared by the Japanese and United States delegations intended to reduce the
trade imbalances between the two countries).
30. Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by Can. Stat. ch.
26 (1986) is divided into two parts. Part I is the Competition Tribunal Act. Part 11, the
Competition Act, amends R.S.C. ch. C-23 (1970), amended by R.S.C. ch. 10 (Supp. I,
1970), R.S.C. ch. 10 (Supp. 2, 1970),further amended by ch. 76, 1974-76 Can. Stat.
and ch. 28, 1976-77 Can. Stat. This law was patterned after the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act, which regulates pre-merger notification rules. 15 U.S.C.
§ 18(a) (1976).
31. See Council Regulation 4064/89, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) I (1989)
[hereinafter EC Merger Control Regulation] (citing in its entirety the European Com-
munity's merger control regulation). Although the system was adopted at the end of
1989, it was not put into effect until Sept. 21, 1990. Financial Times, Sept. 20, 1990, at
24.
32. See EC Merger Control Regulation, supra note 31, at I (citing article 2 and
article 3 of the regulation).
33. See generally B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979) (comparing United States and
Common Market international antitrust policy generally, including merger control
regulations).
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to break up International Business Machines (IBM) was bad industrial
policy that might sink one of the United States' most internationally
competitive companies.3 4 In 1990, Michael Porter authored an equally
persuasive book arguing that nations with strong internal competition
were the toughest internationally, and therefore that gutting the anti-
trust laws would be counterproductive.35 Conflicting yet persuasive ar-
guments such as these illustrate the challenge nations face in trying to
achieve the optimum balance in antitrust regulation.
In addition to finding the best competition policy to promote their
own business opportunities, countries drafting antitrust legislation must
consider the requirements for fairness in international agreements such
as the GATT.3" In 1990, the Bush Administration submitted legislation
to Congress to encourage joint ventures to increase United States firms'
competitiveness. The United States House of Representatives passed
a 1990 bill containing concepts similar to those that President Bush
advocated, that exempts production joint ventures from United States
antitrust prosecution. 38 House Democrats subsequently added a provi-
sion to the bill stating that foreign-owned firms in the United States
34. L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SuMI SOCIETY 148 (1981); see Davidow, Liberation of
Trade Regulation as a Trade Strategy, 1986 COLUNI. Bus. L. REv. 83, 87 (discussing
The Zero-Sum Society and the litigation against IBM).
35. M. PORTER, THE CONIPErITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONs 664 (1990).
36. GATT, supra note 3, arts. 1-8.
37. See Department of Justice, Thornburgh-Mosbacher Send Revision Legislation
to Congress (Press Release) (May 7, 1990) (explaining that the goal of the legislation
is protection of consumers through healthy competition, while allowing cooperative ven-
tures that provide companies with the tools necessary to compete internationally). The
EC has a similar law. Commission Regulation No. 18/85, 28 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L
53) 5 (1985) (EC Block Exemption Law), discussed in B. HAWK, UNITED STATES.
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMIPARATIVE GUIDE 336.
345-53 (1979).
38. National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1990, H.R. 4611, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 136 CONG. REC. H1761 (Apr. 25, 1990) [hereinafter H.R. 4611 ].
H.R. 4611 would extend the notification system and reduce the damages that joint
production ventures might face. Id. See House Committee Clears Measures on Joint
Ventures, Board Interlocks, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1464, at 663 (May 3, 1990) (explaining H.R. 4611 and H.R. 29, the two joint venture
proposals that passed out of the House Judiciary Committee). The Interlocking Direc-
torate Act which increases the Clayton Act § 8 threshold figure, also passed out of the
Judiciary Committee. Id. H.R. 4611 passed the House on June 5, 1990. Official Ac-
tions, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1469, at 902 (June 7.
1990).
Congress introduced several bills in an attempt to stimulate cooperation among
United States firms. H.R. Rep. No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990), reprinted in
[Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 895 (June 7. 1990). The
bills include H.R. 1025, introduced by Rep. Edwards; H.R. 2264, introduced by Rep.
Fish; H.R. 423, introduced by Rep. Wyden; H.R. 1024, introduced by Reps. Boucher
and Campbell; and H.R. 2287, introduced by Rep. Levine. Id.
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could not shelter their activity under the new exemption. 39 Republicans
opposed the amended legislation on the grounds it would violate the
GATT rules and encourage imitation or retaliation abroad.40 A di-
lemma is thus evident: it is difficult to induce Congress to amend the
competition laws unless there is an obvious national advantage. Clear
attempts to achieve national advantage, however, violate the interna-
tional principles of fairness that the United States has supported and
enforced for decades and under which the United States hopes its en-
terprises abroad will be allowed to operate.
The international trade rules used by the United States and the EC
against import competition ideally should be part of a coherent legal
regime of rules for international competition. Nevertheless, strong be-
lievers in free trade and in the purely economic theories of antitrust are
quick to point out that dumping and countervailing duty laws restrain
competition much more than do antitrust laws.41 The trade laws also
contain numerous presumptions and procedural rules which have the
intent and effect of protecting local industry from the full brunt of for-
eign competition. 42 Thus, it is not likely that we will soon see a full
synthesis of antitrust and international trade rules. The two systems
will coexist, interact, and sometimes influence each other, but they are
likely to remain quite separate and distinguishable in terms of content
and goals.
In this constantly changing world of competition policy, it will re-
main important for scholars and policy-makers to write and comment
on its implications. The articles featured in this special International
Competition Rules and Policy issue of The American University Jour-
nal of International Law and Policy expound upon some of the themes
I have just discussed. Senator Metzenbaum discusses whether restric-
39. H.R. 4611, supra note 38, § 7; see also H.R. Rep. No. 516, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1990); reprinted in [Jan.-Jun.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1469, at 895 (June 7, 1990) (explaining the limitation on foreign articles).
40. See, House Passes Joint Venture Bill with Provision on U.S.-Canada FTA,
[Jan.-Jun.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1469, at 873 (June 7, 1990)(providing a summary of the arguments raised by Republicans and the Bush Adminis-
tration opposing the bill (H.R. 4611), especially its § 7 which prohibits foreign firms
from participating in the antitrust protection extended to domestic firms).
41. See Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 199 (1989) (discussing the negative effects that imposing unilateral counter-
vailing duties has on a nation's economic welfare).
42. See Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 13 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 681 (1981) (examining United States antidump-
ing laws and explaining that they remain unchanged since the enactment of the 1921
Antidumping Act). See also Barcelo, The Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-
The U.S. and the International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1972) (pos-
iting that United States antidumping laws limit international trade opportunities).
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tive or permissive antitrust regulation will make United States compa-
nies more internationally competitive. The Senator asserts that a re-
laxing of United States laws governing joint ventures will harm, rather
than help, United States businesses. Current law, he states, provides a
good balance which allows some joint ventures, but stimulates competi-
tion among businesses, thus benefitting the consumer and strengthening
a company's ability to compete internationally.
Dr. James Langenfeld and Attorney Marsha Blitzer, both of the
Federal Trade Commission, contribute an excellent article on evolving
Eastern European competition law and policy. The authors have been
observing the turbulent transitions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
and Hungary as their agencies provide technical assistance to these
countries on their competition policies and law enforcement regimes.
From this unique position, the authors discuss the problems that these
Eastern European countries are encountering in moving from command
to market-based economies. Further, Dr. Langenfeld and Attorney
Blitzer discuss specific technical advice that representatives of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice were able to provide regarding competition issues.
A thoughtful article by Professor Daniel Gifford highlights the dis-
parities between United States antidumping and antitrust laws. In his
article, Professor Gifford analyzes United States regulation of interna-
tional trade through its antidumping and antitrust laws and assesses
the efficiency and effectiveness of these mechanisms. The author also
examines the United States free-trade policy and how laws that at-
tempt to regulate trade are necessary due to certain economic realities.
To reduce inherent conflicts that exist between a free-trade theory and
antidumping laws, the author recommends that courts construe restric-
tive trade legislation in such a way that balances congressional con-
cerns with competitive market policies underlying antitrust laws.
Professor Marsha Huie examines the new EC merger control regula-
tion. She explains the new regulation, discusses the potential dangers it
might pose for U.S. firms, and then uses past EC Commission rulings
on mergers to predict how the regulation will be applied under three
different scenarios. Professor Huie concludes that the EC must admin-
ister the new regulation carefully and consistently to ensure economic
harmony between the EC and its trading partners.
Tania Isenstein's Comment discusses treatment of joint ventures
under United States antitrust law and compares United States rules
with those of one of its trade rivals, South Korea. Ms. Isenstein sug-
gests that the United States could improve its competitiveness by pat-
terning its laws governing joint ventures after those of South Korea.
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Ms. Isenstein concludes that the United States must recognize that its
antitrust laws, aimed primarily at consumer protection, are a factor
contributing to its diminishing ability to compete internationally and
thus should be refocused to make global competition a major goal.
A casenote by Jacqueline Berman uses the recent Consolidated Gold
Fields merger litigation43 in New York to examine some international
policy issues created by United States antitrust rules. She addresses the
problems resulting from the judicial expansion of antitrust law in the
areas of personal and prescriptive jurisdiction and target company
standing in hostile take-over cases. Through an analysis of the Consoli-
dated Gold Fields decision and a comparison of how other courts, legal
institutions, and scholars address the problems presented by that ruling,
Ms. Berman recommends the judiciary exercise restraint and not apply
United States antitrust laws to foreign companies to the degree that the
court did in Consolidated Gold Fields.
This symposium issue touches on some of the most important trends
occurring today in international competition policy. United States,
South Korean, and western and eastern European competition policies
are all discussed. In addition, joint ventures, dumping, and antitrust
policies are all discussed at length and from differing perspectives. As
the world grows increasingly interdependent economically, it will be vi-
tal that policymakers, business leaders, and scholars maintain an open
dialogue about the effectiveness of current national and international
competition policy in order to develop the best, most effective, and most
compatible systems.
43. Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir. 1989).
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